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ILAN KAPOOR
AssrRAcr The practice orientation of Robert Chambers' work on Participatory
Rural Appraisal (pne), which aims at enabling local people and communities to
take control over their own development, has received much attention in develop-
ment circles. This article attempts to shift the emphasis away from pRA's practice
towards its theoretical underpinnings. The article argues that PRA's practice/
empiricist orientation causes it to be insfficiently theorised and politicised. As a
result, questions about inclusiveness, the role of rnt facilitators, and the personal
behaviour of elites overshadow, or sometimes ignore, questions of legitimacy,
justice, power and the politics of gender and dffirence. The article draws on
arguments and debates involving Habermasian 'deliberative democracy' and
post- structuralist notions of power
Most of those who have innovated in developing ene have been practitioners,
concerned with what works. and what will work better. not academic theorists
concerned with why it works. They have been searching not for new theories or
principles but for new and better ways of learning and doing. For them, the power
and utility of ... pRA, undertaken with rapport and self-critical rigor, are empirical
facts of common experience: they know that they work, and that done well they can
lead to better development. (Chambers, 1994b: 1262)
Robert Chambers' work on Participatory Rural Appraisal (pne) has become
remarkably influential in Nco circles and among national and international
development agencies. pRA champions local knowledge and puts forth a method-
ology aimed at enabling local people to take control over their own development.
The practice orientation of this methodology is perhaps what contributes to its
influence among development organisations, whose activities emphasise
programme delivery. This practice orientation probably also explains why the
vast majority of the literature assessing pRA has focused mainly on its successes
and failures in the field (eg Blackburn & Holland, 1998; Holland & Blackburn
1998; Nelson & Wright, 1995). Yet methodologies carry with them philosophical
and theoretical predilections that equally warrant examination. This article is a
step in that direction.r
To start, I would like to argue that it is, in.particular, the empiricist predilection
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of Chambers' work that requires closer examination; later, I will attempt to show
how this predilection leads to insufficient attention to such critical issues as
legitimacy and justice in participatory development. The empiricist predilection
is evident in the epigraph above, and it is underscored repeatedly by Chambers.
He writes that the principles of pne 'have been induced rather than deduced; they
have been elicited by trying out practices, finding what works and what does not,
and then asking why'. (1994b: 1254) And he continues with: 'pRe as it is
emerging is experiential, not metaphysical. Theory has been induced from
practice, from what is found to work, not deduced from propositions. Good
performance has been sought through empiricism' (1994c: 1449). Thus,
'common experience' is privileged over theory; and 'practice', as opposed to
'metaphysics', is emphasised as authoritative and meaningful.
But this empiricism brings with it a number of pitfalls. Taking 'what is' and
'what is done' as given is not conducive to questioning and critique. From a
methodological point of view, the resulting tendency is to get bogged down in
methods and techniques without stopping adequately to consider initial assump-
tions or broader issues (eg about the purpose of the techniques). When something
goes amiss in practice, Chambers' response is to find better ways of doing il his
'and then asking why' is not about asking 'why are we doing what we are
doing?' but 'why does it not work?'. Because Chambers' inductivism is opposed
to 'metaphysics', any problem encountered in practice is addressed through more
and better practice, not fundamental questioning. Chambers appears to construct
a practiceltheory binary opposition that teeters on the fetishisation of practice and
the impoverishment of theory, a point which will be pursued below.
Empiricism has political ramifications, too. To privilege 'what is' is often to
unquestioningly accept the status quo, for instance a situation of gender or social
inequality. The lack of a critical stance can mean simplifying or ignoring broader
relationships between, say, local communities and socioeconomic power
structures. Similarly, to privilege 'what works and what does not' is to downplay
such important political questions as 'what works for whom?' and 'whose
interests are being served?'. The danger of fetishising practice is that it tends to
posit a'pure'practice that can proceed without bias or theoretical abstractions,
independent of, and unfettered by, political concerns about justice and legitimacy.
One would be hard pressed to induce any meaningful practice from a situation of
socioeconomic inequality or exclusion, let alone inducing a 'just' or 'legitimate'
practice.
These methodological and political ramifications will be further developed in
the remainder of this article, when we consider the details and implications of
PRA. The point of highlighting Chambers' empiricist leanings at this initial stage
is to suggest ways in which they frame his work, predisposing pRA to certain
procedural and political problems. My argument is not that his work is empiricist
through and through, or that PRA does not engage in any theorisation and political
critique: Chambers' empiricism, after all, includes theory, but induces it from
practice. My argument, rather, is that his empiricist orientation causes pRA to
be insufficiently theorised and politicised.' Questions about inclusiveness, the
role of pne facilitators, and the personal behaviour of elites overshadow, or some-
times ignore, questions of legitimacy, justice, power and the politics of gender
and difference.
After examining the details of rRe., the article will look into the lack of mean-
ingful grounding of pRe practice and procedures. This discussion will be
facilitated by comparing and contrasting pRA with Habermas's 'deliberative
democracy'. While Habermas shares with Chambers an open-ended and pro-
ceduralist approach, his proceduralism, unlike Chambers', is grounded in
communicative rationality. And although this communicative rationality is not
without its own limitations, it prioritises political concerns about legitimacy and
justice. The article will then move on to explore issues of power in pu. Here, it
will be argued that Chambers' narrow view of power fails adequately to grapple
with broader political-economy and gender issues. Moreover, it will be argued
that, because of his lack of attention to theorisation about power, Chambers
misses out on Foucault's important insights into power/knowledge, which help
reveal the power dimensions inherent in pne itself.
Participatory Rural Appraisal (pru.)
Chambers' work on pRA is developed primarily in three consecutive articles
published in World Development (1994a; 1994b; 1994c) and a monograph,
entitled Whose Reality Counts? (1997), which includes but also expands on much
of the 1994 material. In these works, Chambers acknowledges eRA's indebtedness
to a number of sources,3 but he repeatedly underlines how pne draws on the
cumulative experience and practice of mainly southern NGos active in participa-
tory development in the 1980s and 1990s. In a sense, Chambers presents himself
as a kind of scribe, recording and retrospectively systematising the work of these
NGos; it is no wonder, then, that his work is both so heavily practice-orientated
and atfractive to development organisations working in the field.
As it is dependent on ongoing practice and experience, pRA is a methodologyo
that is open-ended and continually evolving. According to Chambers, the
methodology was developed in response to the tendency within mainly Western-
dominated development organisations to impose knowledge and plans on local
communities. pne is thus 'a family of approaches and methods to enable local
(rural and urban) people to express, enhance, share and analyze their knowledge
of life and conditions, to plan and to act' (I994b: 1253). pna valorises local, as
opposed to Western, knowledge and aims to empower people 'to determine much
ofthe agenda' (L994b: 1255).
Two elements feature prominently in Chambers' work. The first is pRA's
inclusiveness, so that all local community members can participate in pRe
meetings and workshops. Particular attention is paid to including marginalised
and disadvantaged groups: 'The poor, weak, vulnerable and exploited should
come first' (1997: 11, emphasis in the original). Many of the pRA techniques
(described below) subscribe to a broad definition of communication to accom-
modate differing levels of literacy and expressive styles. The second element is
the role played by 'outsiders' in tne, by which Chambers means any persons or
organisations from outside the local community who can play a catalytic role in
facilitating pne. Chambers is especially concerned about (mostly 'Western')
development personnel taking on the role of 'experts'. He devotes a lot of space
in his work deriding the top-down methods used by some of these personnel,
underlining how pRA stands for enhancing the learning, not of outsiders, but
'insiders', and how pRe is participatory, not extractive: 'The outsiders are
convenors and facilitators, the insiders actors and analysts' (1994b: 1263). The
goal is for local communities themselves to take over the role of convenors and
facilitators.
In order to achieve these objectives and principles, rne deploys a host of
methods and techniques. Most techniques involve group-based learning and
planning. An emphasis is placed on visual inputs to ensure that all community
members can participate regardless of literacy levels. For example, shared visual
representation and analysis may involve 'mapping' on the floor or 'ranking'
exercises using seeds, stones or sticks. Some techniques use a combination of
oral, written and visual communication. Often techniques are 'sequenced'
(repeated over time) to maximise participation and gradually build a local know-
ledge base on a particular issue; and sometimes different techniques are used to
investigate the same issue from a variety of angles ('plural investigation').
(1994a: 959; 1994b: 1254-1257, 1263)
The list and description of techniques is too long to enumerate, but here is a
sample: 'do-it-yourself' and 'they do it' techniques that enable villagers to learn
about various community activities, and to collect data (through interviews,
observation, etc), analyse it and present relevant results; group 'transect walks'
through a community area, in which group participants listen, ask questions,
discuss environmental or health problems and seek solutions; oral histories (of
community members); 'institutional' or 'chapati' or 'venn' diagramming to
identify key community individuals and institutions and their relationships to one
another; household profiles and histories; and participatory planning and
budgeting. These pRA techniques are applied to a host of issues, ranging from
natural resource management and agriculture to gender issues and poverty and
social programmng (1994a: 959 
-962) .
Questions of legitimacy, justice and difference
Having outlined the main features of pRA, I would like to identify some of the
gaps in its theorisation. These gaps have specifically to do with a lack of concern
for building legitimacy into pRA procedures, ensuring just outcomes, and repre-
senting sociocultural difference. To this end, it is useful to compare pnn with
Habermas's 'deliberative democracy' as there are important parallels, yet
illuminating differences, between the two.
At one level, Habermas and Chambers appear poles apart, since the former is
primarily a philosopher concerned with democratic theory, and the latter mainly a
social scientist concerned with development practice. Yet the theory/practice
imbalance between the two is precisely what I find instructive. The theoretical
weaknesses in Chambers' empiricist orientation can be teased out through, so-to-
speak, a'Habermasian lens'. I do not wish to exaggerate the theory/practice
imbalance between the two, however: as noted earlier, Chambers does have a
theoretical framework (but, arguably, an insufficiently developed one); and
Habermas's work has never been just theoretical. His writing reflects his active
engagement as a public intellectual in German and European politics since the
1960s.5
Le gitimating procedures ?
Habermas elaborates a notion of the 'public sphere' as an autonomous space,
separate from either economy or state, and in which citizens participate and act
through dialogue and reasoned debate (Habermas, 1989; Calhoun, 1992).In more
recent writings (eg 1996a; 1996b), Habermas develops the specifically delibera-
tive aspects of the public sphere, arguing for the broadening of free speech to
create and strengthen the foundations of democracy (hence the term 'deliberative
democracy'). He shares with Chambers the priority of decenffalising politics so
as to counter the increasing monopolisation of power by the state.6 Habermas also
shares with Chambers a 'proceduralist' view of participation, that is, a commit-
ment to an open, dialogical process that refrains from foisting blueprints upon the
public agenda or limiting it to specific issues.
But unlike Chambers, Habermas anchors his proceduralist democracy in
reasoned debate and rules that give this proceduralism legitimacy: 'democratic
will-formation draws its legitimating force ... from the communicative pre-
suppositions that allow better arguments to come into play in various forms of
deliberation and from the procedures that secure fair bargaining processes'
(1996a: 24). For Habermas, deliberations need to be governed by formal
conditions that are anticipated in the very resort to dialogue and that he calls an
'ideal speech situation'.' This ideal speech situation is one in which there is
uncoerced rational dialogue among free and equal participants: the discussion is
inclusive (ie no one is excluded from participating in the discussion on topics
relevant to herlhim), coercion free (ie people engage in arguments and counter-
arguments freely, without dominating others or feeling intimidated by others) and
open (ie every participant can initiate and continue discussion on any relevant
topic, including the very procedures governing the discussion) (Habermas, 1990:
88-89, 197; 1916: 101-109; Benhabib, 1996:70).
Habermas does not believe it is easy to realise the ideal speech situation or that
there are no important obstacles standing in its way (particularly removing or
minimising power relations between participants). The ideal speech situation, for
him, is not empirical.8 It is a regulative idea, a counterfactual stance from which
to assess and challenge public deliberations and power politics. And, of
late (1996b), as a way of guaranteeing, expanding and regulating deliberative
democracy, Habermas has argued for the institutionalisation through legal and
constitutional mechanisms of the formal rules mentioned above (more on the
implications of this point below).
Chamberso pRA, in contrast, contains no systematic rules or 'legitimating force'
governing participation and group interaction. As noted in the previous section,
there is concern in pne for inclusiveness, especially for the disadvantaged and
women, with corresponding techniques to secure the presence of a wide variety
of community interests at PRA meetings and workshops. There are also, as
mentioned above, rules governing the behaviour of pne facilitators and
'outsiders' to ensure that they, to use Chambers' expression, 'hand over the stick'
and act with transparency, honesty, trust, self-critical awareness, humility,
respect, interest and patience (I994b: 1253, 1256). But apart from the behaviour
of the facilitators/outsiders, once participants are in the pne meeting space, there
are no explicit procedures covering their interactions. Chambers indirectly
defends this lacuna by declaring that even 'minimal rules or conffols'run the risk
of codifying and formalising pRA in the 'name of quality' and at the expense of
participants' spontaneity (1997 : 200; I994c: I44I).
Chambers is right to identify the dangers of over-codifying procedures; but he
does not weigh these dangers against the crucial question of legitimating me
procedures. What ensures that pRA discussions and interactions are coercion free?
What prevents women and disadvantaged people, whom Chambers takes pains to
bring into the pna meeting, from feeling intimidated by authority figures also
present? What allows participants to feel free to broach controversial topics or
question the meeting's procedures? In short, what provisions exist for free and
equal deliberations? One can infer that the onus for fair procedures is placed on
the pnl facilitator (1994b: 1261). However, this solution raises more problems
than it addresses: to grant the facilitator this role bestows upon her/him broad
discretionary powers (eg intervening in discussions, taking sides for and against
participants, etc) and superior 'expertise' that confradict Chambers' stated need
to act with transparency, honesty, humility, respect, etc. In addition, to issue such
discretionary powers to the facilitator, no matter the extent of her/his training,
exposes these powers to potential abuse and corruption; and to entrust such
powers in one participant diminishes those of other participants and compromises
the very participatory purpose of pne. Habermas averts the dangers of entrusting
legitimisation to any person(s) by devising systematic procedures that are
impartial-no one is above them, they apply to all without exception, and they
can be questioned and revised by each participant in concert with all others.
PRA's inadequate systemisation and legitimisation of procedures has other
implications, too. The informality of these procedures can raise doubt and
misffust on the part of local communities. Indeed, David Mosse draws attention
to the suspicion among 'tribal' people in Madhya Pradesh, India of pRe
informality, quoting a 'tribal' woman as saying: "'today you are sitting on the
ground, tomorrow you will be sitting on our heads"' (1994:505; see also Parpart,
2000: 228). nnn often appears new and foreign to communities unfamiliar with it;
its informality may further reinforce this tendency. More serious, though, is that
this informality can end up placing the onus of legitimacy on the commitment of
its practitioners. In particular, it may increase the burden of local communities. If
PRA is to be fair and credible, communities must invest extra energy, time and
resources to come up with legitimating procedures for participation. In turn, this
burden of time and commitment may have gender implications. As several
analysts have pointed out, women's long working days (compared with men's)
sometimes prevent them frorn participating in lnn altogether; and if these women
do participate, their working day is stretched even longer, thereby further aggra-
vating the gender division of labour (Mosse, 1994:512; White, 1996).
Like Habermas, Chambers does call for the institutionalisation of pRe (1994c:
1447; Blackburn & Holland, 1998); yet, for the reasons just noted, without the
systematisation and legitimation of pRe procedures, such institutionalisation may
prove counterproductive. The success of deliberative politics depends 'not on a
collectively acting citIzewy but on the institutionalization of the corresponding
procedures and conditions of communication' (1996a: 27), wites Habermas. For
such institutionalisation means that citizens can engage in deliberation even in
informal settings, in what Habermas calls 'simple and episodic encounters'
(1996b: 361). In this sense, the formality of legitimating procedures endows
deliberative democracy with a degree of informality, allowing it to be integrated
into people's daily lives; while the informality and lack of legitimating pro-
cedures in pna ironically risk making local community fife overly formal, thence
burdening and disrupting people's daily lives.
Just outcomes?
But, for Habermas, legitimating procedures are not enough. Deliberative
democracy must also produce just and equitable outcomes. To this end, as
mentioned but not elaborated above, he grounds participation in rational
discourse. It is reason that helps adjudicate between claims, thus yielding just
decisions. However. Habermas has in mind here not an autonomous" indi-
vidualised rationality, isolated from society and imposing its will without
accountability. Instead, he opts for a dialogical, 'communicative' rationality,
where citizens deliberate together, engaging in arguments and counter-arguments.
A consensus is reached only through the (unforced) 'force of the better
argument': it is an argument-driven consensus that everybody is convinced by
and accepts as reasonable. The more deliberative the process, the more
undistorted the communication and the more likely it is that the consensus will be
acceptable by all concerned (Habermas, 1990: 88ff, 160, 198).
There are at least two sources for Habermas's claim to justice in a deliberative
democracy. The first is that power relationships are minimised so that claims are
assessed by their reasonableness, not by coercion or the socioeconomic status of
the speaker. Policies are adopted when participants determine their rightness after
listening to and debating pertinent arguments and reasons. Thus outcomes are
just and equitable because reason triumphs over power (Young, 1996: 123). The
second source of justice is that consensus is reached through a 'higher-level
intersubjectivity of communication processes' (Habermas, 1996a: 28, emphasis
in the original). Decisions are not reached by adding individual votes; they are
achieved through qualitative discussion and collective compromise. Participants
begin with individual interests, but transcend these interests as public delibera-
tions gradually predispose them to seeking the good of all. Reasoned public
deliberations help everyone reach an expanded view. The result is a movement
from 'mere agreement' to 'rational consensus'.
It is important to underline the critical intention in Habermas's thinking here.
Habermas is concerned 'not just with the ethical validity of laws' but also with
being 'clear about the kind of society [people] want to live in'; this necessitates
bringing 'universal principles of justice into the horizon of the specific form of
life of a particular community' (1996a: 24-25). In the attainment of a rational
consensus, in the movement to a 'higher-level intersubjectivity ', participants are
likely to have to struggle and engage in critique. The to and fro of claim and
counter-claim may involve, for example, both a critique of those institutions that
are deemed to wield unreasonable socioeconomic power in the community and
an appeal to universal human rights. Often, participants will need to debate and
select one claim over another to reach consensus. The adjudicative function of
reasoned debate, therefore, has an important critical function, helping to sort out
differing claims, but also to criticise and minimise the impact of power and
domination inside and outside the deliberative space.'
Like Habennas, Chambers orientates pRA to reaching concrete outcomes. He
speaks of a 'consensus reality' (I994b: 126l) that local communities arrive at in
order, for example, to improve farming systems, manage common property
resources or make health interventions. But Chambers does not specify any
grounding or mediating mechanism for reaching a just consensus. He has no
equivalent to Habermas's communicative rationality. As indicated above, pRA
offers multiple modes of communication (visual, verbal, written) and plural
investigative techniques, primarily to make disadvantaged participants integral to
the dialogical process. In this, it should be mentioned, Chambers is certainly
more detailed. broad and inclusive than Habermas as to what constitutes modes
and styles of expression in human communication. For Chambers, visual forms
of communication, in particular, are'not one-off exceptions but near-universals
largely independent of culture or literacy' (1994b: 1256). However, having plural
forms of communication begs the issue of arriving at equitable decisions. As
Seyla Benhabib points out, consensus-based decisions require a regulative
principle that governs "not only our deliberations in public but also the articula-
tion of reasons by public institutions' (1996: 83, emphasis in the original). Even
the exclusive use of visual communication in a pRA exercise will at some point
run up against the need to deliberate and decide publicly between differing and
beffer/worse visual representations.
As noted above, the absence of a regulating principle also deprives Chambers
of any systematic way of checking power relationships in the pne space.
Chambers shares with Habermas the view that interlocutors can work their way
past power relationships through public discussion. But to this end, Habermas
comes equipped with both ideal speech situation and rational debate; Chambers
does not. A similar conundrum arises when pna is charged with adjudicating
between conflicting claims. Here, Chambers explicitly acknowledges the
problem. He declares that the 'identification, expression and resolution of
conflicts of interest remain a frontier for participatory methods'. And he proceeds
to offer this solution: 'Diagrams are promising as a means to defuse tension by
making agreed fact visible and differences explicit, focusing public debate on
physical things rather than on individual people. There remain both potential and
need for better participatory methods for negotiation and equitable conflict
resolution' (1994c 1445). Accordingly, Chambers' answer to resolving
competing claims in pRR is resorting, not to an adjudicating principle, but to more
and better techniques. In keeping with his empiricist leanings underlined at
the outset, Chambers seeks to resolve problems in pnn practice through more
practice.
But such an answer once again skirts the question of ensuring the justness of
pRA outcomes. In the absence of a grounding principle for deliberation, it is
unclear how pne moves anywhere beyond 'mere agreement'. If consensus there
is, Chambers does not indicate how that consensus is the result of much more
than an exchange of information and an accumulation of knowledge. ene appears
to provide no means of sifting through information or criticising what par-
ticipants determine are erroneous or untenable claims. Moreover, without checks
against unequal power relationships among participants, without critique, there
appears to be little scope for preventing coerced outcomes.'o Thus Chambers is at
pains to show how pnA's informality and inadequate regard for the quality of
decision making guarantees against arbitrary decisions.
Consensus and dffirence
Both Habermas and Chambers acknowledge the importance of sociocultural
pluralism (gender difference, cultural and sexual minority issues, multi-
culturalism, etc) and the importance of arriving at agreements despite difference.
Habermas starts with value pluralism and proceeds to argue for a democratic
proceduralism that yields an acceptable consensus. But he has been taken to task
for erasing difference (Benhabib, 1996: 7-9; Fraser 1989, 1992; Young, 1996;
Mouffe, 1999). The problem is that the very exercise of seeking a consensus risks
using coercion and simplifying diversity. Representing community in uni-
dimensional ways may facilitate the task of achieving results and solutions but, in
so doing, it may also silence or exclude some community voices. Arriving at
single and once-and-for-al1 decisions may thus tend towards obliterating the
value pluralism that Habermas valorises in the first place.
Chambers, for his part, falls prey to these same criticisms. He asserts pRA's
'openness to complexity and diversity' (I994c: 1450) and believes its method-
ology to be consistent with the postmodern celebration of 'multiple realities and
local diversity' (I994c: 1449; see also 1997: 188tr.). But he does not sfrike any
balance between achieving consensus and respecting diversity. He speaks of
community organisations 'reconcil[ing] differences' between people (1994b:
1259) and, to this end, recommends allowing 'people to address conflicts by
putting down suggestions, and using markers to agree or disagree without
needing to identify themselves. This "depersonalises conflicts and introduces
informality where consensus is more easily reached"' (I994c: 1445). What
remains unclear and unresolved is how much of 'reconciling differences' and
'depersonalising conflicts' amounts to an erasure/repression of difference and
how much is the result of acceptable give-and-take.
As a way out of this impasse, Habermas's critics" propose the following
amendments and alternatives, which appear relevant to PRA. Jane Mansbridge
modifies deliberative democracy by suggesting 'informal deliberative enclaves of
resistance in which those who lose in each coercive move can rework their ideas
and strategies, gathering their forces and deciding in a more protected space in
what way or whether to continue the battle' (1996: 47). In the same vein, Nancy
Fraser argues for 'subaltern counterpublics'. Like Mansbridge's 'informal
deliberative enclaves', these are multiple deliberative spaces, but they are linked
through alliances and networks (1992: I23). Chantal Mouffe goes further,
rejecting deliberative democracy altogether. She writes that we need to 'give up
the dream of a rational consensus' in the sense of a totalising and permanent
consensus. Instead, she proposes a more open-ended 'agonistic pluralism', which
is a "'mixed game," ie, in part collaborative and in part conflictual and not as a
[sic] wholly co-operative game as most liberal pluralists would have it' (Mouffe
1999: 750,756).In all three of these proposals the implication is that consensus
need not be, indeed should not be, single and once-and-for-all if difference is to
be respected. Practically speaking, the idea is to have loosely linked, but plural
and heterogeneous, tracks and solutions in social programming. Although it is
outside the scope of this article to address them, many questions remain unsettled
even here, not the least of which are questions about the institutional complexity
and the additional resources that such multi-pronged programming implies.
To conclude this section, a brief consideration once again of the ends of the
Chambers/Habermas comparative analysis just carried out. The purpose has not
been to impose Habermas's views on Chambers' pRA. Even if one rejects
communicative rationality because, among other things, of the inherent risk of
erasing difference, the value of Habermas's work at the very least lies in raising
questions about legitimating procedures and just outcomes in a participatory
process. The weakness of pna is the absence of any ground or mediating principle
(let alone communicative rationality) for effecting legitimacy and justice. Thus,
while Habermas and Chambers share a commitment to proceduralism,
Chambers' is a comparatively thin proceduralism. Equipped with experience in
the field, Chambers offers inclusiveness, informality and multiple rne
techniques. He recognises, and is concerned about, bad pne practice. But his
empiricism deprives him of theorising about principles that could ground such
practice, yield qualitative decisions, and systematically check against arbi-
trariness and power inequalities.
Questions of power
Some of the power dimensions of pRe have been considered in the context of
legitimacy, justice and difference, but it is necessary to examine them more
broadly and in more detail. This section proposes to tease out Chambers' stand
on power, its implications for political change, and its entanglements in the very
framing of pne.
Change through voluntaris m
While Chambers ignores, for the most part, the issue of power in his influential
1994 articles, he rectifies this omission by devoting several pages to power in his
later works (1995; 1997:76 tf.). Here, he speaks of power in the relationship
between 'uppers' and 'lowers': 'Those who are powerful and dominant in a
context are, then, "uppers" and those who are weak and subordinate are
"lowers"' (1997:58). For Chambers, individuals can be multiple 'uppers' or
'lowers', according to their age (youngiold) or sex (male/female) and depending
on where they are located geographically (urban/rural, north/south), profes-
sionally (eg teacher/student), institutionally (eg manager/staff) and so on (1995:
33ff.).
But Chambers equivocates. On the one hand, as is implicit above, he appears to
take a structural and relational view of power, seeing it located in multiple
settings and being played out in the interactions between 'uppers' and 'lowers'.
This view is reinforced by such statements as: 'changes [in power relations]
between uppers and lowers can be positive-sum, with both gaining through a
reduction in the power of uppers' (1997:206). Reminiscent of Habermas (but
minus his legitimating procedures), the statement suggests that power can be
minimised through a dialogical and negotiated relationship.
On the other hand, Chambers appears to endorse a more agent-centred view of
power, which locates power in individuals who intentionally control and use it
(eg for strategic purposes, to impose their will on others, etc). The end here is the
same as in the structural view of power-reducing power, particularly that of
'uppers'-but the prerogative of deploying power lies with the individual agent.
Thus, speaking of the power of the bureaucrat, Chambers writes, 'What prevents
him [the "upper"] learning in this case is not professionalism or bureaucracy. It is
his dominant behaviour, person to person. It is his power' (1997:75).
Yet, when it is time for pRe to effect political change, Chambers does not
equivocate; he opts for the agent-centred view. He repeatedly underlines 'the
primacy of the personaf in pRe (eg L994a: 963; I994c: 1450; 1997:231ff.), so
that rectifying power inequalities lies in personal fransformation: 'Basic to a new
professionalism [in rnn] is the primacy of the personal. This recognizes the
power of personal choice, the prevalence of effor, and the potential for doing
better in this thing called development' (1997: 14). In addition, Chambers places
the onus for such personal transformation entirely on'uppers': 'Putting the first
last is more radical. For it means that those who are uppers and powerful step
down, disempower themselves, and empower others ... It implies that uppers
have to give up something and make themselves vulnerable' (1997:234).
Chambers' solution to the reversal of dominance is, therefore, a voluntaristic
one, relying on the personal choice and behaviour of individual members of elite
groups. He suggests a kind of behavioural training, in which 'uppers' listen, learn
and refrain from lecturing, as an 'effective, interesting and fun' way of bringing
about this change (1995: 39; 1991:207-208). And he appears confident that,
once this behaviour modification takes place, the personal satisfaction that
'uppers' derive from it will be spread, 'upwards, downwards, and laterally to
their peers' (1995: 42).
What is puzzling about Chambers' position is that he takes great pains to
emphasise pRA's group and participatory orientation, yet when it comes to issues
of power he ends up focusing on individual change. Apart from being contra-
dictory, the position is also questionable. First, Chambers does not specify why
the 'upper' would agree to volunteer for behavioural training, and even if s/he
did, why s/he would comply with this training or 'spread the word'. In other
words, Chambers is at a loss to explain what compels such voluntarism. As
previously, pRA trusts in an ungrounded, informal voluntarism that provides no
systematic checks or guaranties against arbitrariness or non-compliance.
And second, Chambers fails to provide any role for 'lowers' in this process.
Just as he did in 'reconciling differences' earlier, he appears to want to avoid
conflict at atl. costs; and excluding 'lowers' in the reversal of domination seems
to achieve this end. Yet, the participatory intent of pRe suggests that, where
power inequalities exist, disadvantaged community members would need to
identify these inequalities specifically (not leave 'uppers' to do so by them-
selves), attempt to address them (in dialogue with the 'uppers'), and ensure
appropriate compliance (with, or perhaps even without, the co-operation of
'uppers'). This most probably would be a messy and tortuous deliberative
process. Here, the power inequalities' identification phase would by itself be
convoluted, requiring some collective analysis and agreement on the relevant
political-economy and institutional locations of power. However, Chambers
omits even this group learning phase, purportedly inherent to pRA, in his discus-
sion of power.
Power in pm,
As indicated above, Chambers adopts a negative view of power, the idea being to
eliminate or reduce it in the pRA space. To him, power is coercive and repressive.
He writes that, 'For learning, power is a disability', and further that, 'A11 power
deceives, and exceptional power deceives exceptionally' (1997:76). But the idea
that power is a disability for learning and hence must be minimised suggests it
can be uncoupled from learning so that learning can flourish unfettered.
This conception misses the important Foucauldian argument that power can be
positive and that powerlknowledge implicate one another." For Foucault, power
induces discourse/knowledge; by the same token, the framing of knowledge
generates forms of power, ie control or surveillance mechanisms (1980: 98). This
view is pertinent to, and has implications for, pne.
Using the Foucauldian argument, Said (1978) and Escobar (1984/85) have
shown how the framing of knowledge in colonialist and development circles
happens through the implicit or explicit construction of binary opposites (eg
Europe/Orient, self/other, North/South, developed/under-developed, etc). This
construction, in turn, establishes power relationships, in which the first term is
made primary and the second is beholden to it or ignored. In the remainder of the
article, I would like briefly to probe three important dualisms deployed by ene
and the concomitant power relationships established. The point of the exercise is
to suggest ways in which power is part and parcel of eRA, in spite of its attempts
to banish power.
Localism. Localism is crucial to pRA, given the desire to move away from
centralised development decision making. But, as Mohan and Stokke (2000)
show, the resulting propensity is to romanticise and essentialise 'the local'. For
example, 'there is a tendency to essentialism [sic] the poor and the social systems
by which they operate. The "poor" are set against an unspecified "elite" whose
only defining feature is their "non-poorness" ... Such binary ontologies under-
mine the stated intentions of pne of seeking diversity' (2000: 253, 249; see also
Mohan, 1999). Similarly, there is a proclivity to refrain from problematising
'local knowledge' as though it is naturally benign. Yet patriarchical community
institutions, which prohibit women from inheritance and land rights, or parochial-
isms such as xenophobia, are far from incontestable.
The other side of the championing of localism is the neglect or disparagement
of the 'non-local'. Indicative of this neglect is, as already pointed out above,
pRA's narrow view of power and its failure adequately to consider wider contexts
in effecting change. Mohan and Stokke label this 'liberal populism', arguing that
it results in downplaying local socioeconomic inequalities and ignoring broader
national and global socioeconomic forces (2000: 249).
Privileging the public domain. pne is by definition a public exercise; but as a
consequence, it under-values the private sphere. This neglect is of particular
relevance to feminists (Parpart, 2000; Mayoux, 1995)," who believe that it can
end up legitimising women's oppression in the home (ie the unequal domestic
sexual division of labour). pRA attempts to stem the problem by using techniques
such as 'household profiles', which aid in identifying domestic inequalities. Yet,
as pointed out earlier, the lack of any critical and adjudicative principle in pne
sheds doubt on the usefulness of these techniques in dismantling patriarchical
values and institutions. In effect, this deficiency places women's domestic
problems outside the scope of pne.
While under-valuing the private sphere, the public character of pRe privileges
public communicative interactions. This, too, has feminist implications. Some
cultures devalue women's public roles, impelling them to be passive relative to
men. This passivity is reinforced if women are expected to raise in public-
visually or orally-sensitive issues such as sex, rape or violence (Mosse, 1994:
509-510; Mayoux 1995). Under these circumstances, women can either resort to
letting men articulate their concerns, or, as David Mosse notes, they 'have to
clothe their ideas and encode their desires in particular ways to make them heard
and accepted as legitimate in the public domain of the PRA. But often, their
particular concerns do not find a place in the consensus which a PRA generates'
(Mosse, 1994: 515). Thus, concludes Jane Parpart, public interaction such as
speaking 'can disempower if it removes the ability to control the dissemination of
knowledge' (2000: 233).
Empowerment and panopticisrTr. pRA depends on 'catalytic' institutions-be they
NGos, community/state organisations, or international development agencies-to
facilitate local empowerment. Much pain is taken, as underlined earlier, to ensure
that these organisations do facilitate, not extract, knowledge. What is not
acknowledged, however, is how such facilitation is double edged: it may further
empowerment (ie freedom), but it may also procure surveillance and discipline
(ie constraint). This is what may be called, in the spirit of Foucault, PRA's
'panoptic' dimension.'o The public character of pRe begets disciplining
mechanisms, where participants monitor and normalise one another's behaviour.
In the example just cited, women 'encode' their communicative interactions in
the presence of the larger community, particularly men. The presence of
facilitating organisations may further reinforce this type of conduct. In the case of
an outside-funded pRA programme especially, people will tend to say and do what
they believe is expected of them (Mosse, 1994: 520; see also Cooke & Kothari,
200I: chs 7, 9). They may feel encouraged to work harder and deliver better
results, or hide their disappointment when something promised is undelivered.
PRA can thus become a type of spectacle, in which people perform roles under
watchful eyes (their community's and those of the funding/facilitating agencies)
thereupon re-defining identities and relationships.
PRA's power dimensions implicate the funding/facilitating institutions as well.
Once pna is adopted by organisations, it creates a new set of issues and problems
for them to identify and manage (eg training, workshops, programme evaluation,
etc). The generation of these new activities, in turn, will tend to give the
organisations a strong interest in justifying, maintaining and propagating rnn
(Rahnema, 1990; Mosse, 2001). If so, pRA's goal for outside organisations to
hand over their responsibilities (ie work themselves out of the job) to local
communities may be jeopardised. In fact, the use of enn by state or international
agencies could lead intentionally or unintentionally to the expansion, not
diminution, of state or foreign power. A more nefarious outcome may even be the
false use of pne by state organisations to co-opt or monitor groups and com-
munities seen as threatening (Nelson & Wright, 1995: 10-11). The absence of
critical or adjudicative mechanisms in pRe makes this outcome at least a
possibility. But in any case, independent of whether pRn is well meaning or not,
well done or not, the point is that it induces power and thereby transforms those
(communities, institutions) who deploy it.
To conclude this section, I would like briefly to underscore Chambers'
empiricist orientation vis d vis power. His focus on practice tends towards the
adoption of a narrow view of power that, on the one hand, ignores or simplifies
broad contexts and relations and, on the other, fails adequately to theorise about
power or consider alternative conceptions of it (ie Foucauldian conceptions).
These predilections are borne out by his agency-led, voluntaristic understanding
of change, which, in contradiction to pRA's prime goal, cuts off learning and
action on power inequality issues from social interaction (ie 'uppers' act on their
own in relation to power inequality). His predilections are also demonstrated by
the construction of binary opposites (1oca1/non-local, public/private, freedom/
coercion). Here, the problem is not their consffuction per se (no conceptualisa-
tion can escape dualisms), but the power implications involved in privileging the
first term and neglecting or repressing the second. There is nothing wrong with,
and in fact much to applaud in, localism; the difficulty lies in essentialising
localism, therein producing exclusions (of the 'outside'). Finally, Chambers'
empiricist predilections are visible in his attempt to argue for 'pure' practice, in
which knowledge and learning are uncoupled or neutralised from power. To his
peril, he misses the fact that power is inherent in pna itself, so that we cannot use
it without it, in turn, using us. As discussed, eRA can enjoin both its agents
(individuals and institutions who facilitate it) and its subjects (people and
communities) to social or panoptic control.
Conclusion
Implicit in the above argument is the idea that, to the extent that Chambers is a
scribe for organisations practicing PRA, the weaknesses identified in his work are
weaknesses that may be reproduced in their practice. The absence of legitimating
procedures and adjudicative/critical mechanisms, the problem of denying
difference in the pursuit of consensus, and the inadequate conceptualisation of
power will all tend to have a bearing on practice. It is possible that these gaps do
not show up all the time in the field, perhaps because of the commitment
and energy of some Nco and community leaders (therein depending more on
personalities than procedures); however, there are no guarantees that the gaps do
not, and will not, show up at least some of the time. (I have cited a few sources
throughout the article confirming that they do, eg Mosse, 1994; Mayoux, 1995;
White 1996; Parpart, 2000; Cooke & Kothari,2O0l). More work is needed in
better theorising and systematising pne, but also in further testing its limits in
practice.
A final, related issue is that, in its present form, pRA can be easily misused or
abused. Chambers repeatedly expresses concern over this eventuality throughout
his work. At one level it cannot be prevented, as any ideology, methodology or
programme takes on a life of its own and is thus comrptible. But, at another level,
PRA leaves itself open to misuse and abuse because it provides too clean a
depiction of practice, refraining, for the most part, from ruffling feathers and
entering into the messy territory of politics.
Notes
Thanks to Kent Mumaghan, as always.
' I am aware of only two recent sources (Parpart, 2000; and Mohan & Stokke, 2000) that deal
specifically with the theoretical underpinnings of Chambers' work on pRA. Parpaft focuses primarily
on the gender implications of pna, and concludes that: 'pRA techniques, particularly as outlined by
Robert Chambers, are undertheorized, especially in relation to power' (p 233). Mohan and Stokke
analyse pRA as part of a trend in participatory development towards 'localism', which, they argue,
downplays local socioeconomic inequalities and ignores broader national and global socioeconomic
forces. I concur with both sources, but locate the weaknesses of pRR in its empiricist methodological
orientation. It is this orientation that begets 'localism' and under-theorised gender/power relations,
and also, as I argue, a lack of attention to crucial questions around legitimacy, justice and
difference/consensus. I would like to point out that, by focusing primarily on the theorisation of pne,
and not its practice, my intention is not to reproduce in reverse Chambers' own practice/theory
dichotomy. Rather, as just stated, the intention is to redress the balance in the pn.q, literature, which is
heavily weighted in favour of identifying good or bad practice and against examination of its
theoretical inclinations. Besides, the article will draw on some empirical literature where it helps to
illustrate, develop or confirm a theoretical point.
' The title of this article, a play on the expression 'the devil's in the details', is meant to convey
precisely this idea, ie Chambers does not pay enough attention to the theoretical underpinnings, or
details, of pnR.
' These include the work of Paulo Freire and his followers, Rapid Rural Appraisal and applied anthro-
pology (see Chambers, 1994a; 1994c).o Chambers' associates, Holland and Blackbum, define 'methodology' and'method'in the following
way: 'Methodology and approach are to be distinguished ftom rnethod, which is a specific tool or
technique. A method is not necessarily restricted to any one methodology' (1998: 5, emphasis in the
original). Note that'methodology'is used interchangeably with'approach'. A methodology is
broader than a method, in the sense that it is committed to a number of philosophical orientations;
methods are a means to attain something. Thus pnn is a methodology/approach that contains a body of
methods and techniques.
' See, for example, Holub (1991) for an exposition of Habermas's public engagement with political
issues, politicians, students and academics.
u As noted in the previous section, Chambers is particularly concemed by the top-down development
bureaucracy of the state and Western international development agencies.
' Note that, of late, Habermas appears to prefer to employ the terms 'norms of discourse' or





Although, for Habermas, the ideal speech situation is based on structures inherent in human language
and communication (Habermas, 1990: 43tf).
Habermas wishes to protect the public sphere from being colonised by outside corporate or state
interests.
That is, no checks other than the deus ex machina of the pne convenor, the dangers and contradiction s
of which have been dealt with earlier.
These critics of Habermas need to be differentiated: as the remainder of this paragraph suggests,
some, such as Benhabib, Mansbridge and Fraser are friendly revisionists who accept the broad
outlines of his deliberative democracy but modify it. Others, such as Mouffe, are fully fledged critics
who reject his deliberative democracy and propose an 'agonistic pluralism' instead. Although the
former theorists accept deliberative democracy and hence some form of an adjudicative and com-
municative rationality, Mouffe's failure to do so leaves unresolved, for example, the question of how
to adjudicate between pluralisms (ie what basis would we have to reject, say, xenophobia and neo-
fascism, or to accept, say, ethnic nationalism?).
It is perplexing that Chambers misses this Foucauldian notion of power, as he contributes a chapter
(1995) to a book that is devoted to power and participation, the introductory chapter of which
specifically develops the notion (Nelson & Wright, 1995: 9ff).
See also Seyla Benhabib (1996: 92-93) and Nancy Fraser (1989, 1992) for their criticisms of
Habermas on the same issue.
Foucault sees Jeremy Bentham's vision of the panopticon-an architectural layout for a prison that
allows a centralised supervisor to monitor all the inmates-to be indicative of modemity's surveil-
lance and disciplining mechanisms. The goal, according to Foucault, is for the inmates to internalise
this surveillance mechanism (1980: 148).
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